














The orthodox view of the computer as a medium or 
medium of media (ie. “new media”) is perfectly justified 
in colloquial discussions, but is hardly evident as an 
objective fact. This does not imply that computers 
are employed in the making of art, rather we are 
investigating a means of initiating the occurrence of 
an artistic experience for the audience, with whatever 
tools are convenient, in this case computers. We 
leverage the feature that logical syllogisms can be 
articulated such as to create systems that act as 
catalysts for Constructivist learning to take place within 
the individual minds of audience members. These 
concrete, but unobservable synaptic adjustments are 
subsequently displayed via unpredicted idiosyncratic 
behaviours. In short, whether or not a computer can 
choreograph a dance, we describe how automated 
machines can coerce humans to dance. In doing so, 
we uncover mysteries as to the ubiquity and influence 
of art on our species.
Keywords: Art-ness; Cognition; Development; 
Interactivity; Modelling; Tool-use; Perception
1 | INTRODUCTION
An orthodox view regarding computer art that 
considers the machine to be medium, namely “new 
media” is perfectly justified as a matter of faith. 
However, when we embark on investigations into 
the details of cognition, we can no longer make 
assumptions about the existence and role of art and 
aesthetics in communication. This is one of several 
problems in Semir Zeki’s theory of neuroaesthetics 
(1999), but is also rooted in much of web art (Greene, 
2004) and the more technical examples of bio-art 
(described in Shasha & Lazere, 2010). Because art 
is so deeply entrenched in culture, this distillation 
is much more difficult in practice than it sounds in 
theory, particularly for those of us who are rather 
invested in time and effort in an art-centric culture. 
Throughout recent history, and easily before that, 
though relevant records prior to the nineteenth 
century that are mostly unavailable to historians, the 
public has continually viewed unprecedented feats 
by novel technologies as having a magical mystique 
that promises to defy physical limitations (Marvin, 
1988; Nadis, 2005). Nonetheless, we need to, at least 
temporarily, avoid the idea of media, as it assumes 
art-ness in ways we aim to clarify.  It is only incidental 
that many artists use the computer, directly (eg. on 
the screen), or indirectly (eg. printed), as a medium 
for exhibiting art, the topic under investigation.
The computer was originally designed by and for 
mathematicians, to aid in performing faster, more 
complex calculations with greater consistency 
than humans could accomplish. For instance 
coordinating remote radar signals from around the 
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US (Waldrop, 2001, p. 101). Combining this utility 
with graphics has proven particularly useful for 
displaying multi-dimensional information, such as 
in weather forecasting.
Though many may justifiably insist that the 
computer can also be used as a medium of self-
expression, this is ultimately a matter of faith. 
Not that it is less valid as such, but this belief is 
not available as a premise to us for the purposes 
this discussion. Generally we might invoke Kurt 
Gödel’s Incompleteness theorem (1962), that the 
vocabulary of art is insufficient in isolation to explain 
art. However, we must be cautious, as it is easy 
to apply his notion too broadly, as he referred to 
mathematic postulates and not to reasoning.
If taken as fact, the nature of art becomes a circular 
argument, where art is an inherent property in 
artefacts, because artefacts are evidence of art. So 
long as art-ness is regarded not treated as conclusive, 
such a paradox is rendered inconsequential.
Nonetheless, computers are employed in this 
discussion, not as media implicating matters of faith, 
but merely as flexible calculating devices.
The term “self-expression” is problematic. A similar 
problem has plagued linguistics in recent decades. 
There is no possibility of an ideally executed 
expression that is inherently interpreted “correctly.” 
A listener, including one who does not share the 
language as spoken, must be accounted for as much 
as the speaker. There is no universal self-expression 
that can be distinguished from say, a seizure, 
without the implicit cooperation of another self, 
with shared cultural influences. Furthermore, these 
influences are highly arbitrary and highly variable, 
such that sharing must also depend on mutual 
agreement between selves. How might the artist 
convince others, who are not already previously 
prone to accept expressions from within a chosen 
culture, that the object is somehow expressive and 
not exclusively a product of accidental forces?
It behooves us at this point to set aside more recent 
examples of computer art. Generative works may 
indeed qualify as art, but before citing these more 
complicated cases, we first must investigate what 
constitutes art, not as an intellectual exercise, but 
and how it might serve some neurological and/or 
evolutionary function (as considered in Bjorklund & 
Pellegrini, 2002; Deacon, 1997). Despite the recent 
history of computer uses by artists and others, 
which perhaps might be seen as the complexity 
concealed by this metaphorical rock, we propose 
a means of utilizing code as a lever to assist in 
overturning conceptual rocks.
Before considering what/how computers are capable 
of (ie. recursion, quantitative measures of topology), 
no doubt anxiously anticipated topics for many 
readers, we need to first reconsider what we might 
learn from our own devout faith in precision itself, 
in order to render our tools relevant in a particular 
cognitive arena, as catalysts of experiences we will 
identify as Behavioural Art.
2 | BEHAVIOURAL ART
To begin, we might say that Behavioural Art (BA) 
is similar to Performance Art, but rather than 
enacted on the stage, it is enacted within the 
audience members’ minds. In BA, the artwork 
is not an object, nor happens on the screen 
(ultimately, also understood as an object), but 
the ongoing conversation process between the 
experience within an audience member’s mind and 
the inanimate system (Wright, 2010). This system 
may include a computer as a convenient means of 
designing complex nested conditionals. In BA, these 
mazes of if-then statements are hardly intended 
to synthesize intelligent behaviours. They merely 
provide the initial cues that we humans interpret as 
a potential “message” worth our further attention.
BA is hardly exclusive to computers. With Reversible 
Destiny/We Have Decided Not to Die (1997) Arikawa 
and Gins created painted canvases that implied 
both board games and logical puzzles, inviting the 
viewer to “play” with these pieces. However, by 
using the medium in expected ways (eg. paint), the 
artist often inadvertently sets a strict limit to the 
level of interactivity (Wright, 2012). Duane Hanson’s 
Museum Guard (1976) may also qualify. This figurative 
sculpture is so realistic, that often gallery visitors ask 
it questions. Though realism is hardly important in 
BA, there occurs a key exchange.  The person speaks, 
then waits. No reply is forthcoming. The audience 
member is actively engaged, if only privately in the 
mind, awaiting the response. A subsequent behaviour 
occurs when the person must then solve the problem 
of why the guard does not react.
Marcel Duchamp’s Fountain (1912), though an 
extremely influential piece for Visual Art, works in 
the opposite way as Hanson’s. Whether this was 
an authentic readymade or not (Danto 2000), his 
observations about the culture of a historical art-
world he was a part of are just as valid. By transforming 
the fixture into a symbol, it hardly matters now what 
life was like for that original fixture. The symbol is 
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the same, referring to a role of such fixtures within 
a particular culture. “Elevating” a urinal at the lower 
end of the social totem pole of man-made stuff to a 
precious work of art in gallery setting, Duchamp is 
essentially saying “this looks like something banal, 
but it is far more important. So resist the urge to 
pee on it!” Reinforced by the gallery presentation, 
the message is “you may be tempted to interact, 
but that would be inappropriate.” We are invited to 
imagine using the urinal to go to the bathroom, but 
are expected not to act on it.
Similarly, at the Exploratorium science museum in 
San Francisco there is a drinking fountain which looks 
like a toilet (Oppenheimer, 1976). There is nothing 
unsanitary about it, and is easily accessible to visitors. 
In this way, it has the opposite effect as Duchamp’s 
piece, by inviting the audience to physically engage 
despite their conceptual urges not to.
Call-and-response in Gospel music is an extremely 
interesting means of interaction in music. But once 
the audience responds, it is unlikely that the caller will 
alter the planned next line of the song. Though digital 
technology is hardly required for BA, to achieve 
the level of interaction sufficient for gross motor 
coordination, in order that Piagetian investigation/
exploration can occur, this degree of responsiveness 
is rather convenient to accomplish via computer 
programming. Without coded instructions, namely 
complex nests of conditionals, neither digital media, 
nor electronics are sufficient in this respect.
Finally, we consider a dance performance by Chunky 
Move called Mortal Engine (2008). In it, the dancers 
wearing black spandex body suits are monitored by a 
camera. The computer performs minimal processing 
to this data before sending it on to the display. In 
this case, the display is a projector, which was aimed 
onto the stage and the dancers themselves. Thus, the 
animation appeared to the audience as a very clever 
shadow. The interaction between the dancers and the 
computer is certainly much deeper than say a light 
switch or list of a few menu options.  But the BA-esque 
aspect of this piece lies with the audience. Observers 
presented with distinct, independent stimuli were 
prompted to mentally see the synchronization of the 
dancer and the shadow as somehow unified, and 
further interpret meanings from their interplay.
3 | A HISTORY OF A PERSPECTIVE
Given only consistently verified physical laws, 
thus disqualifying the notion that art-ness could 
be considered as an extrinsic property, how 
might communication between organic minds be 
accomplished? Consider William James famous 
notion of “psychic pressures,” that impulses are the 
embodiment of strategies employed by the brain 
to relieve internal, somewhat mechanical, conflicts 
(James, 1892). Behaviours, desirable or not, are thus 
by products of psychological needs.
We might now describe art-ness as a common 
result of a species-specific ability, rather than as a 
feature of some remote object. This object might 
be an event on the computer screen, broadcast 
from speakers, shared amongst nodes of a network, 
and so on, but it remains an event that is treated 
conceptually as a thing, tangible or not. Rather than 
a task in detection, perception becomes a task 
in distinguishing amongst the chaos of sensory 
impulses, that constitute our models of culturally 
defined environments (Wright, 2013). If art is 
anything, it is this projective system.
Not without important caveats, computers offer 
the unprecedented possibility of eliminating non-
objective data in calculation. However, this is not 
true of humans determining (a) which aspects 
of the results are relevant, and (b) what the 
output of the computer signifies.  Independently, 
without the aid of attention to ‘curate’ the data 
(Chang, 2002; Schmeichal & Baumeister, 2010), 
the computer remains fundamentally incapable 
of demonstrating this ability. This limitation was 
an important insight Alan Turing described as 
the halting problem (Koch & Tomoni, 2011; Turing, 
1939). While at first this may seem disheartening, 
that objectivity is an impossible ideal the moment 
that the data reaches human apprehension, it 
does open up a more practical, approach to man-
computer symbiosis (Licklider, 1960; Waldrop, 
2001; Weiner, 1950). J.C.R Licklider foresaw a 
prosthetic strategy whereby calculation and 
subjectivity could be integrated, neither the 
machine nor human components of which need 
be expected to accomplish both approaches.
3.1 CONSTRUCTIVISM
In the Piagetian model of cognitive development, 
the child who constructs (as in Constructivism) 
a strategy necessarily involving gross motor 
coordination say, to overturn a rock, in order to 
view the complex life thereby revealed. The child 
learns not only by passive observation, but more 
importantly for us here, by determining a course of 
action that will result in revelation.
For readers less familiar with the debate between 
Constructivism and Platonism (an introduction to 
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this debate occurs in Changeux & Connes, 1995), we 
must first provide a brief frame for this epistemological 
argument. The issue of what constitutes an objective 
reality or if it even exists is not actually our concern here, 
but the issue that there is such a debate, often invoking 
passionate tenacity, is. In some cases, particularly the 
‘hard sciences,’ this debate is ignored stubbornly. It is 
immediately disposed of, as if any discussion regarding 
alternatives to that believer’s root premises about 
belief itself is irrelevant, a waste of time, and serves no 
purpose in furthering scientific inquiry.  While this is all 
somewhat true, this reaction also helps us to explain 
the precise limits of human cognition.
Initially, this line of reasoning begins from the 
(inexplicitly assumed) premise that we are entering 
such a debate, that our objection is philosophical. 
Thus, we might safely conclude any such mention is 
irrelevant before we even begin! However, we take an 
alternative approach and begin by asking specifically: 
why might we insist on believing that more precision 
is synonymous with greater accuracy? Furthermore, 
what we are asking is why we might assume (a) 
that these questions, though perhaps not worth 
considering, do have an answer, (b) that the answer 
is either yes or no, (c) that the answer is determined 
according to some inaccessible ultimate perspective, 
that is somehow not a matter of religious belief and 
(d) we are fairly certain that the answer is obvious, 
that precision is a quantifiable gradation leading to 
objective truth. Before slipping into the quagmire of 
philosophical supposition, an endless meandering 
endeavour, we wish to return to biology and cognition 
(which will eventually lead us to computer art).
By — even temporarily — adopting an approach 
where Constructivism (Piaget, 1971), more precisely 
radical Constructivism as discussed by Ernst von 
Glaserfeld (1995), we have a theoretical description 
of how ideas could be assembled by bootstrapping 
and inherently customized for profoundly personal 
use (Gardner, 1983).
3.2 QUALIA
Our experience of colour is fundamentally different 
than mechanical representations of images. One 
difference is that, while for machines colours are 
represented by absolute values, human perception is 
profoundly relative to context (Albers, 1964; Gregory, 
1966). An ideological fallacy in this respect is 
assumed within research on technological means of 
modality inspired sensation (for instance Rumelhart 
& Zipster, 1985). Human perception makes it difficult 
to appreciate that colour does not exist in the 
world outside of our minds. We might intellectually 
appreciate that flowers evolved to be colourful in 
order to attract bees, which have co-evolved to 
detect colour (Dennett, 1991; Herrero, 2005). But the 
fact that we cannot verify that these colours appear 
to bees as to ourselves, is hardly cause to question 
if the flowers truly get pollinated.
Mathematics has worked well for us, and will certainly 
continue to be a useful strategy. We only wish to 
point out that one-ness, two-ness, and so on, are 
not an a priori givens. As far as we can possibly 
determine, these are akin to other qualia and/or 
emotion (Hohenberger, 2011), applied for the sake 
of enabling human cognition (Baars & Gage, 2010; 
LeDoux, 2002; Tooby & Cosmides, 2008).
We tend to view art as a ‘celebration’ of qualia 
and/or emotion, not that aesthetes necessarily 
favour attractive artwork, perhaps celebrating our 
“advanced” cognitive abilities. One way to interpret 
this is that other organisms are less cognitively 
‘powerful’ than humans. Another interpretation, 
however, requiring far fewer assumptions, is that 
this symbol system is custom-created to the 
specifications of the host organisms. Upon deducing 
that some immediate problem faced can be solved 
with communication, and further that qualia is a 
rather convenient medium at human’s disposal, we 
reinforce a species-centric, arbitrary association.
Sarah Shettleworth (1998) makes a complimentary 
point about nonhuman animals, that whatever their 
behavioural and motor abilities, these cognitive 
abilities only tend to be idiosyncratic strategies the 
organism uses given its own embodied resources, 
rather than any reflection of the degree of that 
organism’s comprehension of the environment. 
There is no ideal vantage point from which to observe 
the universe. It must be taken as a premise on faith, 
that a world beyond the mind exists — roughly in the 
way humans describe it. This leaves functionalists 
in a quandary. If we learn imperfect instances of 
these idealized notions, how can we learn if these 
cannot be real? Jerome Feldman suggests a process 
by which the brain might construct networks 
exclusively via gradually accumulating metaphorical 
understandings (2008).
According to Piaget’s famous approach… it 
entails the accommodation of those schemata 
that aren’t able to assimilate a current 
information, that is: adaptation is required 
if a schema faces a serious problem. Those 
schemata and structures that cannot adapt will 
become “extinct”.  In other words: adaptation 
is a theory of selection and evolution — also 
during ontogeny.  (Greve, 2013)
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By adopting a Constructivist perspective, we reject 
the need to maintain the untenable assumption of 
objectivity.  Optimization, implemented as game 
theory (pioneered by von Neumann & Morgenstern, 
1944; since integral to programming design as in 
Horzzyk & Tadeusiewicz, 2005), and designed 
modularity (Izhikevich, 2007; but see also Newcombe 
et al. 2009) become artefacts of human behaviour. 
However, in his overview of neural networking, 
Olaf Sporns states that “Nervous Systems do not 
converge onto a final stable pattern of optimal 
functionality, rather, their connectivity continues to 
be in flux throughout life.” (2011, p. 252)
3.3 NUMEROSITY
Particularly when considering the effects perception 
has on our interpretations of number (Dehaene 
& Changeux 1993; Hubbard, et al. 2009), we are 
forced to consider the question: What aspect of 
our experience can we objectively determine is 
not yet another quale? Of particular relevance to 
our discussion, estimation is not a less accurate 
version of precise counting, but that subtizing is 
a quale that is often performed in tandem to the 
cognitive activity counting, Kadosh and colleagues 
findings speculate that this provides an explanation 
regarding competing perceptive cues in the 
Stroop effect (2011).  Ordinarily, this effect is seen 
in slowed response times when subjects must 
identify words, such as “red,” that are presented 
in, say, blue letters. The experiment suggests that 
a momentary hesitation is caused by a cognitive 
strategy for automatically resolving, though not 
always accurately, conflicts between two perceptive 
systems. Just as the automatic apprehension of 
colour can be over-ridden but not suppressed, so 
too an estimation quale is likely involuntary, but 
can be upstaged by another conscious intentional 
process. This appears consistent with:
Is brain-and-mind based mathematics all 
that mathematics is? Or is there, as Platonists 
have suggested, a disembodied mathematics 
transcending all bodies and minds and 
structuring the universe — this universe and 
every possible universe?… The question of the 
existence of a Platonic mathematics cannot be 
addressed scientifically. At best, it can only be 
a matter of faith, much like faith in God. That is, 
Platonic mathematics, like God, cannot in itself 
be perceived or comprehended via the human 
body, and mind... The only mathematics 
that human beings know or can know is, 
therefore, mind-based mathematics, limited 
and structured by human brains and minds. 
(Lakoff & Núñez 2000, pp. 1 – 4)
What is actually meant when we ask whether an 
organism understands number (Schifter 2005; 
Sfard, 2008; Vallortigara 2009). This single word 
“number” is used to refer to distinct cognitive skills. 
What we are questioning here is that there is no 
actual non-subjective evidence that these integers 
are not simply a subjective description like that 
of colour, which exists only in the imagination, 
triggered by hardly-understood anatomical 
mechanisms. Though we do not absolutely discount 
the possibility of counting numbers, we also do not 
see any hard evidence of them ‘out there’ beyond 
species-specific perception.
We mentioned previously the ability to re-perceive 
multiple quantities as groups, as in subtizing (Baars 
& Gage 2010; Lakoff & Núñez 2000). Though it 
would be difficult to verify experimentally, consistent 
evidence occurs indicating that humans can increase 
this limit with years of extensive training in specific 
domains.  Adults at the supermarket surely do not 
count every other customers’ items precisely to 
determine which register line will move the fastest.
The qualitative shift in effortful attention (Dietrich 
& Stoll, 2010; Searle, 2001) between subtizing and 
counting also indicates that this reflex applies 
more broadly to amounts than merely numbers. 
For example, we can consider the gradual learning 
progression in Western music from a non-musician 
primarily oblivious to the chords heard, the novice 
musician painstakingly determining such chord 
spelling with mixed success, and the master musician 
with years of experience who, upon hearing the 
pitches, apprehends the harmonic structure, with 
near-perfect accuracy and no intentional effort. 
Other animals demonstrate varying abilities 
here (Pierce, 1999). For instance, pigeons show a 
remarkable ability to recognize quantities, though 
most mammals do not (Thompson & Contie, 1994). 
As adults, developed from infants, we do not 
replace our ability to estimate, but it appears that 
we sometimes enhance it.
In contrast, we also have an ability, that tends to 
require a bit of effortful attention, to use precise 
counting, which is generally only reliably testable in 
language-using subjects. Delving more deeply into 
why this should be so, involves thinking about the way 
brains construct conceptualisations from linguistic 
cues (Feldman 2008; Lakoff & Johnson 1980; Seyfarth 
1984; Vygotsky 1986), which differs radically from 
language determining how we think about things, 
such as numbers. Learning does take place without 
language, for instance to ride a bicycle. But often 
learning can be aided by utilizing concepts we already 
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understand, in ways  that happen to recognize by their 
verbal role, namely embodied metaphor.
4 | DIGITAL FORMALIZATION
It often seems, even to scientists and engineers, 
as if the computer performs mathematics. The 
ambiguity (which is entirely subjective) is made 
clearer at the somewhat esoteric, absolute lowest 
level of the physical mechanics of the machine. The 
computer only accomplishes something like rote 
memorization. In education, a child may respond 
with the coincidentally correct number, parroted 
from a dictation exercise, but that child may have 
absolutely no idea how this answer was derived. Not 
unlike ELIZA’s original ability to pass Turing tests 
(Weizenbaum, 1966), this often fools traditional 
educators into believing the child has learned to 
solve the problem.
FIGURE 1 | This depicts our triadic relationship with computers. 
The computer has no sense of its own holism, its mechanical 
parts, or its own behaviour. As a middle, fairly optional, part of 
a three step process, the computer can only aspire to indirectly 
encourage the rudiments of meaning within cooperating 
human minds.
In this case, the computer processor executes a 
command, written in the form of binary code (this 
description closely summarizes Nisan & Schocken, 
2005, and curiously remains only common 
knowledge to members of rather select fields).
The binary commands of fixed-bit-length are not 
numbers per se but notations of signals. Each 
delineated range of digits tells the processor how 
to manipulate on/off settings in specified memory 
slots (essentially a transistor). In the long list of 
commands, each one is of the form “memory 
address of some source value — operator — operant 
— destination memory address.” Furthermore, each 
coded command is strictly independent of other 
lines. In moving segments of binary settings from 
memory slot to memory slot, the processor looks 
to the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU) to indicate which 
procedure to follow.
Moreover, the word “operations” is somewhat 
misleading, since these are only mathematical 
operations in the minds of the highest level 
programmers and engineers of the system, to the 
machine they are simply options of which mechanical 
steps to execute next. Similarly, if one got from 
say Kansas City to Tucson exclusively by following 
instructions “left,” “right”,” or “straight,” given one 
instruction at a time, we would not say the driver 
“knows” the way to get from one city to the other. 
The ALU does not perform mathematics, but uses 
a “look up table” of instructions to parrot with near-
perfect fidelity. Comparing each digit of the binary 
values from right to left, the ALU simply responds to 
the computer processor, where say 0101 translates 
to option number 5, with something like:
 If the digits are 0 and 0,
  return value 0.
 If the digits are 1 and 0,
  return value 1.
 If the digits are 0 and 1,
  return the value 1.
 If the digits are 1 and 1,
  return the value 0,
  carry 1 to next digit comparison.
LISTING 1 | A rough approximation of the Arithmetic Logic Unit’s 
look-up table, showing the processor performs arithmetical 
operations not by learning the concept, but simply executing 
instructions by rote.
Boolean logic coincidentally can be notated using a 
fixed binary configuration of digits. “Every Boolean 
function no matter how complex, can be expressed 
using three Boolean operators only: And, Or, and Not.” 
(Nisan & Schocken, 2005, p. 9) That a 0 tends to mean 
“false” and a 1 tends to mean true are entirely arbitrary, 
but by adopting this arbitrary scheme, we can further 
say a 0 tends to turn something off, while a 1 tends to 
turn something on. Form there, most and syllogism 
can be associated with some mechanical execution.
The ALU iterates through these options, in lieu of 
actually ever understanding addition in even the 
simplest sense. Multiplication and other common 
arithmetic operations are passed off to the ALU in 
a like manner. The processor only derives all of the 
complicated functions of the computer by looking 
up this table, over and over. Though this description 
may strike the reader as criticism, actually this is a 
fundamental strength that results in the absolute 
consistency that makes computer processing so useful. 
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However, contrary to popular intuition, rather than 
complexity, the computer merely performs tediously 
long lists fast enough to be appear unpredictable, 
and unpredictably enough to appear complex. The 
result is not unlike a formation of dominoes, which 
merely obey a chain of physical laws. There is no 
optimal arrangement of dominoes possible that 
would yield a system capable of generating novel 
messages, thus the occurrence of expressiveness 
must lie outside of this system. Though the dominos 
might be arranged as a Rorschach test that triggers 
personal association in the audience member, further 
triggering observable behaviour.
5 | CONCLUSION
Our aim is to describe the subtle distinction between 
what we experience, as description of reality “out 
there,” and our very indirect systems for detecting 
specific aspects of our environments. Amazingly, 
from these imperfect clues, we manage to draw 
up a mental model we call reality. The fact that 
it corresponds to reality is simply philosophical, 
unprovable and irrelevant. However, by adulthood 
this model does function well enough relative to a 
select current culture. Specifically, culturally relevant 
questions must be synchronized with the fluid 
environment to be useful. As neither a culture nor 
environment is static, that model must be continually 
fine-tuned, but by what means? It is hardly novel to 
think of this learning process as art (Dewey, 1934), 
though the details of this process have remained 
vague, despite “advances” in psychology.
Nonetheless, as a tool, within a process yielding 
learning in an audience, the digital computer can be 
extremely useful. The resulting calculation is subject 
to context for interpretation by the audience. Though 
it is equally as unlikely that we could build a brain 
with bricks as with binary digits, it is no less handy 
to configure bricks in order to build useful things — 
such as a research gallery for computer art.
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